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Abstract
This work focuses on (j,2) games in which there are several levels of approval
in the input, i.e games with n players, j ordered qualitative alternatives in the
input level and 2 possible ordered quantitative alternatives in the output. When
considering (j,2) games, we extend the Public Good index (PGI), the Null Player
Free index (NPFI) and the Shift index (SI) and provide full characterizations of
these extensions.
KEYWORDS: (j,2) games, Shift index, Public Good index, Null player Free Index
JEL Classification Numbers: C71;D71.
1 Introduction
This paper analyses the relationship between the production of an output and the
likelihood of an individual to influence the production of this output. This cardinal
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measure can be seen as the extent to which an individual is useful in this production.
Such a problem can be modeled with simple games in which it is standard to study
the influence of an individual, by using indices. The most famous are the Shapley-
Shubik (Shapley and Shubik [1954]) index, the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf [1965]) and
the Deegan-Packel index (Deegan and Packel [1978])1. The Shapley-Shubik index
and the Banzahf index both suppose that the benefit of the production of an output
is only assigned to ”pivotal” individuals. A pivotal individual changes a coalition
from a losing to a winning one. The more an individual is ”pivotal” in the produc-
tion of the good, the bigger his influence and the greater the benefits he derives. Note
that these two indices only consider the formation of winning coalitions as relevant,
i.e. coalitions that ensure the production of the output. The Deegan-Packel index
results from assuming that only the minimal winning coalitions are likely to form
intentionally. A winning coalition is a minimal winning coalition when the removal
of any of its members would prevent the coalition from the production of the good.
Only the individuals who are members of these minimal winning coalitions are sup-
posed to be influential. Intuitively, an individual who is not needed to raise the
aggregate output above a certain threshold (a surplus individual), has no influence
on the production of the output and, furthermore, has no incentive to be a member
of that minimal coalition. Deegan and Packel [1978] suppose that all the players
in a minimal winning coalition equally share the benefits of the production of the
output. All these indices have a common factor: the value of the coalition, once
formed, can be interpreted as a private good, which can therefore be split among the
coalition members even though it was created collectively.
In Barry [1980] and Holler [1982] it has been argued that those measures are
inadequate since the value of the coalition, once formed, could not be seen as a
private good but as a public good. According to these authors, coalition forma-
tion is not about sharing benefits (private good) but about producing goods which
cannot be produced by separate individuals. Holler [1982] introduced the public
good index (PGI), which is based on the principles of non-rivalry in consumption,
non-excludability of access, and the non free-riding property. The PGI is an alterna-
tive measure assigning influence proportionally to the number of minimal winning
coalitions an individual belongs to. As it is the case with Deegan-Packel index, it
is assumed that the coalitions that are not minimal are irrelevant when it comes to
1We refer to Andjiga et al. [2003] and Laruelle and Valenciano [2008] for a detailed description of
indices.
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measuring influence. Therefore, they should not be taken into consideration since
they can potentially free ride when coalitions determine the production of public
goods.
Following the approach of Holler [1982], Alonso-Meijide and Freixas [2010] and
Alonso-Meijide et al. [2011] introduced two extentions of the PGI when considering
a bigger or smaller set of winning coalitions. Alonso-Meijide et al. [2011] introduced
the Null Player Free index (NPFI) in which they evaluate influence by considering
the set of null player free winning coalitions. A winning coalition is said to be a
null player free winning coalition if no null player belongs to the coalition. In other
words, only a coalition in which there are no ”free riders” must be taken into ac-
count to evaluate the influence of the individual. Note that such coalitions are less
restrictive than minimal ones since there are no ”free riders” in the latter, as well as
no ”surplus individuals”. Alonso-Meijide and Freixas [2010] introduced the Shift in-
dex (SI) based on the PGI and the Riker’s principle (Riker [1982]). They introduced
the notion of shift minimal winning coalitions, in which the winning coalition that
is finally formed to produce a good, contains no surplus individuals. Moreover, no
individual within it can be replaced by a weaker individual because, in this case, the
status of winning coalition would no longer be maintained.
It has been pointed out by many scholars that a number of interesting questions
in economics, politics and more generally social sciences cannot be described by
a simple game. Indeed, the observation of real life shows that several levels of
participation in public decisions or collective productions are often present. This
goes some way towards explaining the introduction of (j,2) games by Freixas and
Zwicker [2003a]. These are games in which individuals choose from among j levels
of approval their degree of contribution to the production of the output. These in-
dividual choices partition the whole society into j coalitions, each possible partition
facing two levels of collective approval. This class of games generalizes the class of
simple games which allow only two levels of approval: to participate in the produc-
tion and to not participate in the production. The final outcome being ”to produce”
or ”not to produce” depending on whether the final bipartition resulting from the
individual choices. 2
Freixas [2005a] and Freixas [2005b] extend the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf
indices to (j,2) games. However, one can formulate the same criticism as Holler
2There is a large literature on game in which there are multiple alternatives of support, see Courtin
et al. [2016] and Courtin et al. [2017] for a recent review.
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[1982] for these two extensions. We argue that the influence of an individual (who
is not a free-rider) does not depend on her level of contribution to the production of
an output. Whatever their level of contributions, individuals belonging to a parti-
tion that ensures the production of the output (a winning partition) must have the
same influence. The difference of influence between two individuals depends on the
number of winning partitions these individuals belong to. Our main contribution is
to extend and fully characterize the PGI, the NPFI and the SI when (j,2) games are
taken into consideration
This work is structured as follows. The next section introduces some notations
and presents the considered concept of games. Section 3 defines and characterizes
the PGI for (j,2) games. Section 4 extends our analysis to the NPFI and SI index,
while Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Simple game
A finite set of individuals (players) is denoted by N = {1,2, ...,n} and 2N is the set
of all subsets of N . Any non-empty subset of N is called a coalition. A classical
cooperative n-person game in characteristic form is a pair (N,v) where v : 2N → R
is such that v(∅) = 0.
Such a game is called a simple game (SG) if : (i) v(S) ∈ {0,1} for all S ∈ 2N ; (ii)
v(N ) = 1; and (iii) v is monotonic (v(S) ≤ v(T ) if S ⊆ T ⊆ N ). In a SG, a coalition S is
said to be winning if v(S) = 1 and losing otherwise. W (v) denotes the set of winning
coalitions of the game (N,v) . A coalition S is a minimal winning coalition in (N,v)
if v(S) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for any T ⊂ S. M(v) is the set of minimal winning coalitions
of the game (N,v), while Mp(v) is the subset of minimal winning coalitions formed
by coalitions S ⊆ N such that p ∈ S. An individual is a null player if she does not
belong to any minimal winning coalition. For the sake of simplicity, a game (N,v)
will be denoted v when there is no ambiguity.
2.2 Index
An index is a mapping ϕ assigning to each SG a n-dimensional real-valued vector
ϕ(v) = (ϕ1(v), ...,ϕn(v)). ϕi(v) can be interpreted as the influence (power) of player
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p ∈ N in the game v. In this paper we focus our attention on the indices, in which
the set of minimal winning coalitions plays an important role.
Public Good index
Holler [1982] supposes that only minimal winning coalitions are relevant when it
comes to measuring influence. He introduced the Public Good Index (PGI) which
assigns to each player p ∈N the real number:
hp(v) =
|Mp(v)|∑
p∈N |Mp(v)| .
The PGI of a player p is equal to the total number of minimal winning coalitions
containing player p, normalized by the sum of these numbers for all players.
Holler and Packel [1983] show that the PGI is the unique index that satisfies
the axioms of null player, efficiency, symmetry and PGI-mergeability. Following
the first axiom, a null player gets nothing. Efficiency states that the sum of the
individual influence shares equals one. Symmetry says that if two individuals play
the same role, then they should have the same influence. Finally, PGI-mergeability
implies that influence in a union game is a weighted mean of the influence of the two
component games, where the weights come from the number of minimal winning
coalitions in each component game.
An alternative characterization is due to Alonso-Meijide et al. [2008] who re-
placed the axiom of PGI-mergeability with the property of PGI-minimal monotonic-
ity. According to this axiom, if the set of minimal winning coalitions containing a
player p in a game w is a subset of the minimal winning coalitions containing this
player in another game v, then the influence of player p in the game v is not less
than the influence of player p in the game v, once this influence is normalized by the
number of minimal winning coalitions of every player in games v and w.
Null Player Free index
Alonso-Meijide et al. [2011] extend the PGI when considering a set of coalitions big-
ger than the set of minimal winning coalitions and smaller than the set of winning
coalitions. This set is based on the notion of a null player. A winning coalition S is
a null player free winning coalition if there is no null player p ∈ S. The set of null
player free winning coalitions will be denoted by NPF(v) and the set of null player
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free winning coalitions which p belongs to by NPFp(v). The Null player Free Index
(NPFI) assigns to each player p ∈N the real number
npfp(v) =
|NPFp(v)|∑
p∈N |NPFp(v)| .
In order to characterize this index, A´lvarez-Mozos [2012] intoduced the null player
free-minimal monotonicity (NFP-minimal monotonicity), which follows the same
idea of the PGI-minimal monotonicity, when considering null player free winning
coalitions. The NPFI index is the only index that satisfies the efficiency, symmetry,
null player and NFP-minimal monotonicity axioms.
Shift index
Alonso-Meijide and Freixas [2010] argue that not all the minimal winning coalitions
will be formed, and use a smaller set of minimal winning coalitions named shift
winning coalitions. A shift minimal coalition is a minimal winning coalition which
is stable, in the sense that no player in it can be replaced by a weaker player, because
the new coalition becomes a losing coalition. In order to make the notion of a weaker
player clearer we need to recall the desirability relation between players introduced
by Isbell [1958].
In a simple game v, p is said to be more desirable than q, denoted by p  q if
the following two conditions are fulfilled: i) for every coalition S such that p < S
and q < S, S ∪ q ∈ W (v) ⇒ S ∪ p ∈ W (v); ii) there exists a coalition T such that
p < T and q < T , T ∪ p ∈ W (v) and T ∪ q < W (v). Players p and q are said to be
equally desirable, denoted by p ∼ q if: for any coalition S such that p < S and q < S,
S ∪ p ∈W (v)⇐⇒ S ∪ q ∈W (v).
The desirability relation (or the influential relation) denoted by  is defined on
N as follows: p  q if p  q or p ∼ q.
We can now introduce the notion of shift minimal winning coalition. For a game
v and its desirability relation , a coalition S ∈ M(v) is shift minimal if for every
p ∈ S and q < S such that p  q, it holds (S\p)∪ q < W (v). The set of shift minimal
coalitions will be denoted by SM(v).
Alonso-Meijide and Freixas [2010] assume that only shift minimal winning coali-
tions are relevant and then introduce the Shift Index (SI) which assigns to each
player p ∈N the real number:
sp(v) =
|Sp(v)|∑
p∈N |Sp(v)| .
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where Sp(v) is the set of shift minimal coalitions S such that p ∈ S.
Alonso-Meijide and Freixas [2010] showed that this index also satisfies the null
player, efficiency, symmetry axioms, as well as the shift-minimal monotonicity. The
later axiom is a monotonicity axiom when considering shift minimal winning coali-
tions instead of minimal winning coalitions.
Example
To conclude this subsection, let us illustrate the various concepts introduced above
through the following example. Let the game v on N = {1,2,3,4,5,6} be defined by
the following set of minimal winning coalitionsM(v) = {(12), (13), (14), (15), (234), (235), (245)}.
It ensues that the desirability relation is 1  2  3 ∼ 4 ∼ 5  6. Note that 6 is a null
player. The different sets SM(v), NPF(v) and W (v) are presented in the table below
in which we can see that SM(v) ⊂M(v) ⊂NPF(v) ⊂W (v).



(13), (14), (15), (234), (235), (245) SM(v) (12) M(v)
(1234), (1235), (1245), (123), (124), (125), (134), (135), (2345), (145), (12345) NPF(v)
(126), (136), (146), (156), (2346), (2356), (2456), (12346), (12356), (12456), (1236),
(1246), (1256), (1346), (1356), (23456), (1456), (123456) W(v)
After taking into account the different sets of minimal winning coalitions of each
of the individuals, we obtain these indices:
s(v) = ( 315 ,
3
15 ,
3
15 ,
3
15 ,
3
15 ,0)
h(v) = ( 417 ,
4
17 ,
3
17 ,
3
17 ,
3
17 ,0)
npf (v) = (1456 ,
12
56 ,
10
56 ,
10
56 ,
10
56 ,0)
We observe that: i) Player 6 who is a null player has always zero power. ii) The
Shift index gives the same power to all the players (as the exception of 6). Since
the minimal coalition (12) is outside the set of shift minimal coalitions, the power
of 1 and 2 decrease whereas those of 4 and 5 increase with the Shift index. iii) The
distribution of power between the Public good index and the Null player free index
is similar.
2.3 (j,2) Games
For any positive integer r , let Ir denote the set {1,2, ..., r}. An ordered j-partition of
N is a sequence A = (A1,A2, ...,Aj) of mutually disjoint subsets of N whose union
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is N . Any subset Al , l ∈ Ij is allowed to be empty, and we think of Al as the set of
individuals whose level of approval is l. The highest and lowest levels of approval
are, respectively, 1 and j. We denote by N j the set of all ordered j-partitions of N .
For any ordered j-partition A and for any l ∈ Ij , we define ↑ Al = A1 ∪A2 ∪ ...∪Al .
Let A1 and A2 be two j-partitions. We write A1 ⊆j A2 if A1 can be transformed into
A2 by shifting one or more voters to higher levels of approval. That is, A1 ⊆j A2⇔
∀l ∈ Ij ,↑ A1l ⊆↑ A2l . Finally A1 (j A2 means: A1 ⊆j A2 and A1 ,A2.
A (j,2) game (N,V ), with j ≥ 2, consists of a finite set N of players together with
a value function V : N j → {v1,v2} where {v1,v2} is the value set of (N,V ) whose
elements are any 2 objects equipped with a strict linear ordering v1  v2 and such
that for all ordered j-partitions A1 and A2, if A1 ⊆j A2, then V (A2) = V (A1), or
V (A2)  V (A1). Note that in a (j,2) game, V = (N,∅, ...,∅) = v1 and V = (∅,∅, ...,N ) =
v2.
In the following, we let v1 = win and v2 = lose, and we denote by W (V ) the set
of all j-partitions A of N such that V (A) = win. Those j-partitions will be referred
to as winning j-partitions.3 From the set of winning j-partitions, we can define the
set of minimal winning j-partitions,M(V ). A j-partition A1 is a minimal winning
j-partition whenever A1 is a winning j-partition and A2 is a losing j-partition if
A2 ⊆j A1. This means that if an output can be produced with a smaller contribution
of at least one of the individuals, the j-partition is not a minimal one.
The purpose of (j,2) games is to generalize simple games where only ”yes” and
”no” votes are considered (j = 2). In the following, when there can be no confusion,
a (j,2) game (N,V ) will be denoted V .
Note that for any j-partition A and any player p, A(p) denotes the level of ap-
proval of p in A and Arp, the j-partition in which player p (alone) moves, from A(p)
to level r.
In order to illustrate the terminology of a (j,2) game, Freixas and Zwicker [2003b]
present the following real situation. At the United Nation Security Council, a res-
olution is carried if at least nine members support it and no permanent member is
explicitly opposed. Let P = {1,2,3,4,5} and R = {6,7, ...,15} be the set of permanent
members and non-permanent members respectively.The corresponding (j,2) game
is given by :
3For a numerical representation of a (j,2) game, we set, as usual, V (A) = 1 for any winning j-
partition and V (A) = 0 for any losing one.
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V (A) = V (A1,A2,A3) =
 1 if |A1| ≥ 9 and A3 ∩ P = ∅0 otherwise
with A1 being the set of voters of N who vote ”yes”; A2 the set of voters of N who
”abstain”; and A3 the set of voters of N who vote ”no”.
3 The Public Good index for (j,2) games
In this section, we extend the PGI to (j,2) games, and we outline two axiomatic
approaches for this new index in this context.
Considering (j,2) games, an index is a mapping φ which assigns to each (j,2)
game a vector φ(V ) = (φ1(V ), ...,φn(V )). Let Cp(V ) = {A ∈M(V ) : p < Aj} and cp(V ) =
|Cp(V )|. cp(V ) expresses the number of minimal j-partitionsA in which player p does
not chose the last level of approval j. The PGI for (j,2) games is then given by
Hp(V ) =
cp(V )
c(V ) .
where c(V ) =
∑
p∈N cp(V ).
In a (j,2) game, the PGI of a player p is equal to the total number of minimal
winning j-partitions in which player p does not chose the last level of approval,
normalized by the sum of these numbers for all players.
The PGI for (j,2) games presented above is based on three principles:
1. Along the spirit of Holler [1982], we choose to not give an amount of power
to the surplus players and to the free riders players. It is assumed that some
winning partitions are not stable and they should not be taken into consider-
ation for measuring the power. Indeed, in some winning partitions a player
might feel unhappy because she think that she could obtain more power by
excluding some players. Hence, our first principle consists in consider only
minimal winning j-partition, in which there is neither surplus player nor free
rider player.
2. To complete our analysis, one needs to add a second principle. Contrary to
simple game, in which all minimal winning coalitions are taking into account
to compute the index, this extension excludes some minimal j-partitions. Since
all the players belongs to a minimal j-partition, not excluding j-partitions
would lead to give an equal power to all the players whatever the game. We
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choose to not give power to players who contribute at the last level of support.
As an example, in (2,2) games in which the players can participate or not to
the production of the good, this implies that we do not give power to a player
who chooses to not participate.
3. Finally, we assume that all the other players must be rewarded in the same
way, whatever their contributions along the original idea behind the PGI in-
dex. Once a public good is delivered, all the players must benefit of it, what-
ever their own contribution and the way in which others contribute (as the
exception of those who do not contribute). In other words, players can have
different contributions, but sharing the same amount of power.
Let us now introduce some axioms.
A player p is called a null player if p ∈ Aj for every minimal winning j-partition
A. A null player can never help an arbitrary losing j-partition to win.
Let φ be an index for (j,2) games.
Axiom 1. (Null player)
p is a null player for V implies φp(V ) = 0
Axiom 2. (Efficiency)∑n
p=1φp(V ) = 1
Before to present the next two axioms, one need to introduce the following nota-
tion. For a given minimal j-partition A, let Ip(A) the fraction of power receives by
player p.
Axiom 3. (Minimal Additivity )
φ satisfies minimal additivity for (j,2)-games if for any V , for all player p,
φp(V ) =
∑
A∈M(V ) Ip(A)
Axiom 4. (Minimal Homogeneity)
φ satisfies minimal homogeneity for (j,2)-games if for anyA ∈M(V ) and for all p,q < Aj ,
Ip(A) = Iq(A)
According to Axiom 1, a player who always contributes to the last level in a
minimal winning j-partition has no influence. Axiom 2 means that the sum of the
influence is equal to one. Axiom 3 implies that the power of a player p depends on
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the fraction of power received in each minimal j-partition considered to evaluate
the power. Axiom 4 states that the amount of power of a player in each minimal
j-partition is the same whatever her relative position inside the partition.
In most of influence (power) indices characterization, the key axiom is usually an
additive axiom, which relates the influence in two separate games (N,V ) and (N,W )
to the influence in a certain join game derived from of (N,V ) and (N,W ). For (j,2)
games in general (and for simple games in particular), the Shapley-Shubik influence
index verifies the transfer axiom, which is not the case of the PGI index. However it
satisfies a ”similar” property, the merger axiom.
Let (N,V ) and (N,W ) be two (j,2) games. The (j,2) game (N,V ∨W ) is defined
as follow. For any j-partition A, V ∨W (A) = max(V (A),W (A)). The games V and W
are said to be mergeable if for allA ∈M(V ) it holdsA <W (W ) and for allA ∈M(W )
it holds A <W (V ).
If two games (N,V ) and (N,W ) are mergeable, the minimal winning j-partitions
in the max game (N,V ∨W ) are precisely the union of the minimal winning j-
partitions in the two separate games (N,V ) and (N,W ). In other words, the minimal
j-partitions related to the two separate games are also minimal j-partitions for the
max game. It is easy to see that this condition guarantees that | M(V ∨W ) |=| M(V ) |
+ | M(W ) |.
Axiom 5. (Mergeability)
V and W mergeable implies that for all p ∈N ,
φp(V ∨W ) = c(V )c(V∨W )φp(V ) + c(W )c(V∨W )φp(W )
According to the mergeability axiom, the influence in a merged game is a weighted
mean of the influence of the two component games. The weights come from the
number of minimal winning j-partitions (in which the player p does not choose the
last level of support) in each component game, divided by the number of minimal
winning j-partitions (in which the player p does not choose the last level of sup-
port) in the merged game. Hence, it is similar to the transfer axiom in the sense
that it assesses the influence in a merged game in terms of the influence in the two
component games.
Note that when considering influence of an individual in a (j,2) game (as in sim-
ple game), we are not dealing with strategic consideration of that individual. In-
deed, the measure of influence take into account the information embodied in the
11
decision-making process modelled in the game considered. Of course, the individ-
ual characteristics and preference influence the final outcome. But such information
is left aside when considering influence index. The influence indices are intended
to quantify the a priory implication of a decision-making rule, not any particular
application of them.
Back to the merger axiom, it is true that the behavior of an individual in the
games (N,V ) and (N,W ) can be quite different to the behavior in the game (N,V ∨
W ), however one can not take into account this information when we measure the
influence. 4.
Theorem 1. Letφ be an index for (j,2) games. Thenφ satisfies Axiom 1, Axiom 2, Axiom
3, Axiom 4 and Axiom 5 if and only if φ =H .
Proof. 5
Existence
It is obvious that H satisfies the efficiency, the null player and the minimal ho-
mogeneity axioms. The minimal additivity axiom is verified since for all p ∈ N , we
have Hp(V ) =
∑
A∈M(V ) Ip(A) with Ip(A) =
 1c(V ) if p < Aj0 otherwise
Let us prove that H satisfies the mergeability axiom. Let V1 and V2 be two (j,2)
games on N and p ∈ N . If V1 and V2 are mergeable then, it is easy to verify that
Cp(V1∨V2) = Cp(V1)∪Cp(V2) and Cp(V1)∩Cp(V2) = ∅, which implies that cp(V1∨V2) =
cp(V1) + cp(V2). Therefore,
Hp(V1 ∨V2) = cp(V1∨V2)c(V1∨V2) =
cp(V1)+cp(V2)
c(V1∨V2)
=
cp(V1)
c(V1∨V2) +
cp(V2)
c(V1∨V2)
=
Hp(V1).c(V1)
c(V1∨V2) +
Hp(V2).c(V2)
c(V1∨V2)
= c(V1)c(V1∨V2)Hp(V1) +
c(V2)
c(V1∨V2)Hp(V2)
Uniqueness
Conversely, let φ be an index which satisfies efficiency, null player, minimal ad-
ditivity and minimal homogeneity axioms. We shall prove that φ = H. In order to
4We thanks a Reviewer for this remark
5The arguments used in the proof are very similar to those used in Holler and Packel [1983] to
characterize the Public Good Index for simple game. The main difference resides in the fact that here
we consider (j,2) games.
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do so, let V be a (j,2) game and p ∈ N. We will proceed by induction on the num-
ber of minimal winning j-partitions of V . Assume that M(V ) = {A = (A1,A2, ...,Aj)}
that is, |M(V )| = 1. Since |M(V )| = 1, then by minimal additivity φp(V ) = Ip(A).
From minimal homogeneity Ip(A) = Iq(A) for all p,q < Aj . From efficiency, it follows
that
∑
q∈N
Iq(A) = 1. Moreover ∑
q∈N
Iq(A) = ∑
q∈Aj
Iq(A) + ∑
q<Aj
Iq(A) = ∑
q<Aj
Iq(A) because
from the Null player axiom, Iq(A) = φq(V ) = 0 for all q ∈ Aj . But, for all q < Aj ,∑
q<Aj
Iq(A) = ∑
q<Aj
Ip(A) = Ip(A).|N \Aj |; thus, Ip(A) = 1|N\Aj | = φp(V ) for all p < Aj . Note
that N \Aj , ∅ because from the definition of a (j,2) game, V (∅, ...,∅,N ) = 0. On the
other hand, we know that Hp(V ) =
 1|N\Aj | if p < Aj0 otherwise . Thus, Hp(V ) = φp(V ).
Let r > 1 and assume that Hp(V ) = φp(V ) holds for all game V for which there
are at most r − 1 minimal winning j-partitions. Consider a game V with r minimal
winning j-partitions, say A1, A2, ..., Ar .
The games V1 ∨ ...∨ Vr−1 and Vr are mergeable, where Vr is the (j,2) game with
the single minimal j-partition Ar .
Furthermore, V = [V1∨ ...∨Vr−1]∨Vr and it follows, from the mergeability axiom
that
φp(V ) =
cp(V1∨...∨Vr−1)
c(V ) φp(V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1) +
cp(Vr )
c(V ) φp(Vr)
=
cp(V1∨...∨Vr−1)
c(V ) Hp(V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1) +
cp(Vr )
c(V ) Hp(Vr)
(thanks to the induction hypothesis)
= 1c(V )cp([V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1]∨Vr) (because H satisfies the mergeability axiom)
=
cp(V )
c(V ) (because of the mergeability of V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1 and Vr)
= Hp(V )
In conclusion, for all game V on N , all player p ∈N , φp(V ) =Hp(V ).
We now put forward a second axiomatic characterization based on the property
of PGI minimal monotonicity. Following the PGI minimal monotonicity for simple
games, this property compare the behavior of a player p in two different games V
and W in which the players are the same and in which the two sets of minimal
winning j-partitions are linked.
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Axiom 6. (PGI-minimal monotonicity)
φ satisfies PGI-minimal monotonicity for (j,2) games if for any pair (N,V ) and (N,W ),
φp(V )c(V ) ≥ φp(W )c(W )
for all player p ∈N such that Cp(W ) ⊆ Cp(V )
According to this axiom if the set of minimal winning j-partitions containing a
player p in game W is a subset of the set of minimal winning j-partitions containing
the same player p in another game V , then the influence of player p in game V is
not less than power of player p in game W . In other words, if player p improves her
position in a game, her influence in the game must increase.
Theorem 2. Letφ be an index for (j,2) games. Thenφ satisfies Axiom 1, Axiom 2, Axiom
3, Axiom 4 and Axiom 6, if and only if φ =H.
Proof. Existence
We know that H satisfies the efficiency, null player, minimal additivity and min-
imal homogeneity axioms. In addition H satisfies the minimal monotonicity axiom
because if p is a player such that Cp(V1) ⊆ Cp(V2), then cp(V1) ≤ cp(V2) which means
that Hp(V1)c(V1) ≤Hp(V2)c(V2).
Uniqueness
Conversely, let φ be an index which satisfies efficiency, null player, minimal ad-
ditivity, minimal homogeneity and minimal monotonicity. Let V be a (j,2) game
and p ∈ N. Again, we will proceed by induction on the number of minimal winning
j-partitions of V .
Once more if |M(V )| = 1, as we have done before, we prove that φp(V ) =Hp(V ).
Now assume that Hp(V ) = φp(V ) holds for all game V for which there are at
most r − 1 minimal winning j-partitions and consider a game V with r > 1 minimal
winning j-partitions, say A1, A2, ..., Ar .
Now, set T =
r⋂
t=1
(N \Atj) and let p ∈N :
First case: assume that p < T . Consider the (j,2) game V0 defined such that
M(V0) = {At ∈M(V ) : p ∈N \Atj}.
By definition of V0, it follows Cp(V0) = Cp(V ), which, by the axiom of minimal
monotonicity yields φp(V0)c(V0) ≤ φp(V )c(V ) ≤ φp(V0)c(V0), that is, φp(V0)c(V0) =
φp(V )c(V ).
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Since p < T , the (j,2) game V0 has less than r minimal winning j-partitions. Thus,
φp(V0) =Hp(V0) thanks to the induction hypothesis. On the other hand, asH satisfies
the minimal monotonicity axiom, we have Hp(V0)c(V0) =Hp(V )c(V ).
We conclude that φp(V )c(V ) = φp(V0)c(V0) = Hp(V0)c(V0) = Hp(V )c(V ), which
implies φp(V ) =Hp(V ).
Second case: p ∈ T
By the minimal homogeneity axiom, we have φp(V ) = φq(V ) and Hp(V ) = Hq(V )
for all p,q ∈ T , and furthermore for all u < T , φu(V ) =Hu(V )
By efficiency (of φ and H), we have :∑
u∈T
φu(V ) +
∑
u<T
φu(V ) = 1 =
∑
u∈T
Hu(V ) +
∑
u<T
Hu(V ).
This implies that
∑
u∈T
φu(V ) =
∑
u∈T
Hu(V ), that is, |T |φp(V ) = |T |Hp(V ) and finally,
φp(V ) =Hp(V ).
Let us now evaluate the influence of each member of the United Nation Security
Council. One need to first consider the minimal winning j-partitions of such game.
Such partitions can be split in six types. Table 1 summarizes the 6 types, the number
of each types, and gives also the number of times a permanent (non permanent
member) is not at the last level of support in each type of partition .
Table 1: United Nation Security Council
Type Total Number Permanent Non-Permanent
(4 R + 5 P ,∅,Other) (94) = 126 126 (
8
3) = 56
(5 R + 4 P ,1 P ,Other) (95) ∗ (54) = 630 630 (84) = 70
(6 R + 3 P ,2 P ,Other) (96) ∗ (53) = 840 840 (85) = 56
(7 R + 2 P ,3 P ,Other) (97) ∗ (52) = 360 360 (86) = 28
(8 R + 1 P ,4 P ,Other) (98) ∗ (51) = 45 45 (87) = 8
(9 R,5 P ,Other) 1 1 (83) = 1
Total 2002 2002 219
This table shows that the public good index of a permanent member is equal to
2002
11981 ' 0.1670 and the public good index of a non-permanent member is equal to
219
11981 = 0.0183. Since a permanent member is a veto player, she belongs to all the
minimal winning j-partitions and she has a higher power .
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4 Two public good index extensions
In this section, following the approach of Alonso-Meijide et al. [2011] and Alonso-
Meijide and Freixas [2010], we consider two extensions of the PGI. First, we assume
a bigger set of minimal j-partitions and we introduce the Null Player Free index for
(j,2) games. Second, we restrict the domain of minimal j-partitions to shift minimal
j-partitions, and propose a Shift index for (j,2) games.
4.1 The Null Player Free index for (j,2) games
LetNPF (V ) = {A ∈W (V ): p null player implies p ∈ Aj}. This is the set of winning j-
partitions for which all null players lie at the last level of approval j. In the following,
we denote byNPF p(V ) = {A ∈ NPF (V ) : p < Aj} the set of null player free winning
j-partitions in which player p is not at the last level. The Null Player Free Index for
(j,2) assigns to each player p ∈N the real number
NPFp(V ) =
|NPF p(V )|∑
p∈N |NPF p(V )| .
The difference between NPF index for (j,2) games and the PGI for (j,2) games lies in
the considered winning j-partition . For the PGI, these are the minimal j-partitions
whereas for the NPF index, these are the null player free ones. In other words, when
using the NPF index to measure the influence of a player, one needs to consider
only winning j-partitions in which the ”free-rider” players stay at the last level of
support. A ”free-rider” player is a player who can never help an arbitrary losing j-
partitions win nor can she prevent a winning one from losing. This extension follows
the definition of the null player free winning coalitions in which only winning coali-
tions whitout null players are considered. A simple game can be represented by a
(2,2) game with A = (A1,A2). Our definition implies that all the winning j-partition
with null players in A1 are not considered. Note that, in a minimal j-partition there
are no ”free-rider” players but this is not a sufficient condition. One needs to add
the absence of surplus contribution to completely describe such partitions.
To characterize this new index, one need to extend the additivity and the ho-
mogenity axioms.
Axiom 7. (NPF-minimal Additivity )
φ satisfies NPF-minimal additivity for (j,2)-games if for any V , for all player p,
φp(V ) =
∑
A∈NPF (V ) I¯p(A)
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I¯p(A) the fraction of power the player p receives when the null player free mini-
mal j-partition A emerges.
Axiom 8. (NPF-minimal Homogeneity)
φ satisfies NPF-minimal homogeneity for (j,2)- games if for any A ∈NPF(V ) and for all
p,q < Aj ,
I¯p(A) = I¯q(A)
Following A´lvarez-Mozos [2012], we intoduce the null player free-minimal mono-
tonicity for (j,2) game.
Axiom 9. (NPF-minimal monotonicity)
φ satisfies NPF-minimal monotonicity for (j,2) games if for any pair (N,V ) and
(N,W ),
φp(V )
∑
p∈N
∣∣∣NPF p(V )∣∣∣ ≥ φp(W )∑p∈N ∣∣∣NPF p(W )∣∣∣
for all player p ∈N such thatNPF p(W ) ⊆NPF p(V )
Once again, the monotonicity axiom describe the behavior of a player p in two
simple games V and W with the same set of players, and in which the set of the null
player free winning j-partitions in which player p is not at the last level in game W
is included in those of game V . The axiom states that the influence of player p must
be ”bigger” in game V than in game W (after normalization).
Theorem 3. Letφ be an index for (j,2) games. Thenφ satisfies Axiom 1, Axiom 2, Axiom
7, Axiom 8 and Axiom 9, if and only if φ =NPF.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from a similar reasoning to the one used in
the proof of Theorem 2.6
4.2 The shift index for (j,2) games
We follow two principles for this second public good extension. Firstly, we assume
that every player wishes to form part of a minimal winning j partition. Secondly,
6The NPF-minimal additivity of the null player free index is given by I¯p(A) = 1∑p∈N |NPF p(V )| if p ∈N \Aj0 otherwise
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every player prefers to be partner with weaker players, as far as the j-partition is
winning. Therefore we consider a smaller set than minimal j-partitions: the shift
minimal j-partitions. To introduce these special j-partitions one needs to recall the
notion of desirability for (j,k) games introduced by Pongou et al. [2011] and Pongou
et al. [2017].
Desirability relation for (j,2) games
The desirability relation for (j,2) games, p < q is defined as follows: for all A ∈ N j
such that A(p) =A(q) = l ∈ {2, ..., j}, for all r < l, if Arq ∈W (V ) then Arp ∈W (V ).
We say that p is more desirable than q (p  q) if p < q and not(q < p). Moreover, p
and q are said to be equally desirable, denoted p ∼ q if : p < q and q < p. 7
Shift index for (j,2) games
Let V be a (j,2) game and < be its desirability relation. A j-partition A ∈ M(V )
is said to be shift minimal if for every p,q ∈ N such that A(p) > A(q) and p  q,
it holds pipqA < W (V ), where pipq is the transposition of p and q. We denote by
SM(V ) the set of shift minimal winning j-partitions of V . In the following, we use
the notation SMp(V ) = {A ∈ SM(V ) : p < Aj} as the set of shift minimal winning
j-partitions of V in which player p is not at the last level. Its cardinality is given by
smp(V ) = |SMp(V )|.
The Shift index for (j,2) game of a player p, is defined by :
Sp(V ) =
smp(V )
s(V ) where s(V ) =
∑
p∈N
smp(V ).
In a (j,2) game, the influence of a player measured by the SI index, consists on
counting the number of stable minimal j-partitions in which this player belongs to
and in which she does not choose the last level of support. In such a context, a stable
minimal winning partition is a partition in which it cannot be possible to exchange
the level of support of a player p with the level of support of a weaker player q (who
has a smaller level of support), without altering the status of the j-partition. This
means that the j-partition obtained from such a replacement does not lead to the
production of the good.
7Properties of the desirability relations can be found in Pongou et al. [2014].
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Axiom 10. (Shift-minimal Additivity )
φ satisfies shift-minimal additivity for (j,2)-games if for any V , for all player p,
φp(V ) =
∑
A∈SM(V ) Iˆp(A)
Iˆp(A) can be seen as the fraction of power the player p receives when a shift
minimal j-partition A emerges.
Axiom 11. (Shift-minimal Homogeneity)
φ satisfies shift-minimal homogeneity for (j,2)- games if for any A ∈ SM(V ) and for all
p,q < Aj ,
Iˆp(A) = Iˆq(A)
Axiom 12. (Shift-minimal monotonicity)
φ satisfies shift-minimal monotonicity for (j,2) games if for any pair (N,V ) and
(N,W ),
φp(V )s(V ) ≥ φp(W )s(W )
for all player p ∈N such that SMp(W ) ⊆ SMp(V ).
The meaning of the three axioms are very similar to the previous one. The differ-
ence lies on the minimal j-partitions considered.
Theorem 4. Letφ be an index for (j,2) games. Thenφ satisfies Axiom 1, Axiom 2, Axiom
10, Axiom 11 and Axiom 12, if and only if φ = S.
Proof. Existence
We know that S satisfies Axiom 1, Axiom 2, Axiom 10 8 and Axiom 11. In ad-
dition S satisfies the shift minimal monotonicity axiom because if p is a player such
that SMp(V ) ⊆ SMp(W ), then smp(V ) ≤ smp(W ) which means that Sp(V )s(V ) ≤
Sp(W )S(W ).
Uniqueness
Conversely, letφ be an index which satisfies Axiom 1, Axiom 2, Axiom 10, Axiom
11 and Axiom 12. Let V be a (j,2) game and p ∈ N. Again, we will proceed by
induction on the number of shift minimal winning j-partitions of V .
8The shift index is shift minimal additive with Iˆp(A) =
{ 1
s(v) if p < Aj
0 otherwise
.
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If SM(V ) = {(A1, ...,Aj)}|, that is, |SM(V )| = 1, then we also have SM(V ) =M(V ).
From Axiom 1, Axiom 2 and Axiom 10 and Axiom 11, it follows that for all p,q ∈
N \Aj , φp(V ) = φq(V ), and for all p ∈ Aj , φp(V ) = 0; therefore we obtain:
φp(V ) =
 1|N\Aj | if p ∈N \Aj0 otherwise
Note that N \ Aj , ∅ because from the definition of a (j,2) game, (∅, ...,∅,N ) <
W (V ).
On the other hand, we know that Sp(V ) =
 1|N\Sj | if p ∈N \Aj0 otherwise .
Thus, φp(V ) = Sp(V ).
Now assume that φp(V ) = Sp(V ) holds for all games V for which there are at
most r −1 shift minimal winning j-partitions and consider a game V with r > 1 shift
minimal winning j-partitions, say A1, A2, ..., Ar .
Now, set T =
r⋂
t=1
(N \Atj) and let p ∈N :
- If p < T .
Consider any (j,2) game V0 such that SM(V0) = {At : p ∈N \Atj}.
By definition of V0, it follows that
SMp(V ) = {A ∈ SM(V ) : p < Aj} = {A ∈ SM(V ) : p ∈N \Aj}
= {At : p ∈N \Atj}
= {A ∈ SM(V0) : p < Aj}
= SMp(V0)
which, by Axiom 12 yields φp(V0)s(V0) = φp(V )s(V ).
Since p < T , the (j,2) game V0 has less than r shift minimal winning j-partitions.
Thus, φp(V0) = Sp(V0) owing to the induction hypothesis. On the other hand, as S
satisfies Axiom 12, we have Sp(V0)s(V0) = Sp(V )s(V ).
We conclude that Sp(V )s(V ) = Sp(V0)s(V0) = φp(V0)s(V0) = φp(V )s(V ).
This implies that Sp(V ) = φp(V ).
-If : p ∈ T :
By Axiom 11, we have φp(V ) = φq(V ) and Sp(V ) = Sq(V ) for all p,q ∈ T .
Furthermore, for all u < T , φu(V ) = Su(V ). By efficiency (of φ and S), we have :∑
u∈T
φu(V ) +
∑
u<T
φu(V ) = 1 =
∑
u∈T
Su(V ) +
∑
u<T
Su(V ).
This implies that
∑
u∈T
φu(V ) =
∑
u∈T
Su(V ), that is, |T |φu(V ) = |T |Su(V ) and finally,
φu(V ) = Su(V ).
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5 Concluding discussion
On the characterization
The null player, efficiency, additivity and homogeneity axioms appear in all charac-
terizations presented above.The homogenity and the additivity axioms depend on
the set of minimal winning j-partition considered. In addition to these four prop-
erties, which use only one game in their definitions, another property is necessary
to characterize each of the indices presented in this paper. This last property must
be one of the group of properties that establish an inequality between two games
(monotonicity properties) or an equality between the union game and the compo-
nent games (mergeability properties). Depending on the property used, each one of
the three indices is characterized.
S H NPF
Shift monotonicity PGImonotonicity or Mergeability NPFmonotonicity
Shift minimal Additivity Minimal Additivity NPF minimal Additivity
Shift minimal Homogeneity Minimal Homogeneity NPF minimal Homogeneity
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency
Null player Null player Null player
Example
To illustrate the different indices, we will study the following (3,2) game with N =
{1,2,3,4} and the set of minimal winning j-partitions is given by
M(V ) = {(13,2,45), (5,12,34), (12,3,45)}. Note that, in this game, 4 is a null player
and we have the following desirability relations: 1  2  3  4 and 5  4. The
different kinds of winning coalitions are depicted in the following figure:
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(13,2,45) (5,12,34) SM(V) (12,3,45) M(V) (123,∅,45) (12,35,4) (125,3,4)
(123,5,4) (1235,∅,4) (13,25,4) (135,2,4) (15,2,34) (25,1,34) (5,123,4) (35,12,4)
(125,∅,34) (15,23,4) (25,13,4) (235,1,4) (1235,∅,4) NPF(V)
(12,34,5) (124,3,5) (123,4,5) (1234,∅,5) (12,345,∅) (1245,3,∅) (125,34,∅)
(124,35,∅) (123,45,∅) (1234,5,∅) (1235,4,∅) (12345,∅,∅) (13,24,5) (134,2,5)
(13,245,∅) (1345,2,∅) (135,24,∅) (134,25,∅) (123,45,∅) (1234,5,∅) (1235,4,∅)
(5,124,3) (54,12,3) (15,24,3) (145,2,3) (25,14,3) (245,1,3) (5,1234,∅) (345,12,∅)
(35,124,∅) (45,123,∅) (15,234,∅) (145,23,∅) (25,134,∅) (2345,1,∅) (235,14,∅)
(245,13,∅) (125,4,3) (1245,∅,3) W(V)
After taking into account the different sets of minimal winning j-partitions of
each one of the players, we obtain the following indices:
H(V ) = (39 ,
3
9 ,
2
9 ,0,
1
9 )
S(V ) = (26 ,
2
6 ,
1
6 ,0,
1
6 )
NPF(V ) = (1970 ,
19
70 ,
16
70 ,0,
16
70 )
We observe that the j-partition (12,3,45) is not a stable partition and should not
be taken into account to evaluate power with the Shift index. In this j-partition
the level of approval of player 2 is greater than that of player 3, and player 3 is
weaker than player 2 according to the desirability relation. Player 1 prefers to be
with a weaker player (player 3) in A1, since the partition (13,2,45) is still winning.
Therefore, player 3 looses power. We can remark that the weakest players (player 3
and 4) have more power with the Null player free index than with the Public good
index, as it was already the case with simple game.
Alternative PGI generalization
Our PGI generalization to (j,2) games seems to us to respect the spirit of the original
PGI index for simple game. In our approach, players who dot not belong to the
last level of approval in a minimal winning j-partition receive the same amount
of power. An alternative generalization consists to make distinction between the
different level of approval.
For all (j,2) game V , for all l ∈ {1,2, ..., j}, denote by c∗p(V ) =
∑
A∈M(V )
2(j−A(p))
j(j−1) and
c∗(V ) =
∑
p∈N
c∗p(V ).
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The rational number 2(j−A(p))j(j−1) can be seen as the fraction of power a player p
receives when she chooses a level of approval l in a minimal winning j-partiton
A. Note that this fraction is equal to zero when a player chooses the last level of
support j, which is consistant with Holler [1982]’s approach. For example, for A =
(A1,A2,A3), a player who choose A1 will be rewarded with
2
3 of the power, a player
who chooses A2 obtains
1
3 , whereas a player in A3 has no fraction of power.
An alternative definition of the PGI for (j,2) games is given by
H ∗p(V ) =
c∗p(V )
c∗(V ) .
According to these new index, players belonging to the same level of contribution
get the same fraction of power; and more the contribution is high, more the fraction
of power is high.
We can now characterize this new index. It is easy to show that the null player
and the efficiency axioms are satisfied by this alternative index. Concerning the
merger axiom, only the weighted are changed:
Axiom 13. (Mergeability∗)
V and W mergeable implies that for all p ∈N ,
φp(V ∨W ) = c
∗(V )
c∗(V∨W )φp(V ) +
c∗(W )
c∗(V∨W )φp(W )
And finally we introduce a new axiom which is formalised below:
Axiom 14. (Proportionnality ∗)
φ satisfies Proportionality for (j,2)- games if for any A ∈M(V ) and for any p,q ∈N \Aj ,
Ip(A)
j−A(p) =
Iq(A)
j−A(q)
According to this axiom, in all minimal winning configuration in which players
does not choose the last level of approval, their power are proportionnal to the level
of approval they choose. Note that, when there is only one minimal winning config-
uration, this axiom implies that the power of two individuals who choose the same
level of approval is the same. Moreover if two individuals choose always the same
level of approval, their power is equivalent. We obtain the following result:
Theorem 5. Letφ be an index for (j,2) games. Thenφ satisfies Axiom 1, Axiom 2, Axiom
3, Axiom 13 and Axiom 14, if and only if φ =H ∗.
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Proof. Existence
H ∗ satisfies Null player : If p is a null player then for all A ∈M(V ), p ∈ Aj , c∗p(V ) = 0
and thus H ∗p(V ) = 0
H ∗ satisfies efficiency : obvious,
∑
p∈N
H ∗p(V ) = 1.
H ∗ satisfies mergeability∗ : If V1 and V2 are mergeable then, it is easy to verify that
c∗p(V1 ∨V2) = c∗p(V1)∪ c∗p(V2) and c∗p(V1)∩ c∗p(V2) = ∅, which implies that c∗(V1 ∨V2) =
c∗p(V1) + c∗p(V2). Therefore,
H ∗p(V1 ∨V2) = c
∗
p(V1∨V2)
c∗(V1∨V2) =
c∗p(V1)+c∗p(V2)
c∗(V1∨V2)
=
c∗p(V1)
c∗(V1∨V2) +
c∗p(V2)
c∗(V1∨V2)
=
H ∗p(V1).c∗(V1)
c∗(V1∨V2) +
H ∗p(V2).c∗(V2)
c∗(V1∨V2)
= c
∗(V1)
c∗(V1∨V2)H
∗
p(V1) +
c∗(V2)
c∗(V1∨V2)H
∗
p(V2)
H ∗ satisfies minimal additivity : By definition, for all game V , for all p, we have
H ∗p(V ) =
c∗p(V )
c∗(V ) where c
∗
p(V ) =
∑
A∈M(V )
2(j−A(p))
j(j−1) . ThenH
∗
p(V ) =
∑
A∈M(V )
2(j−A(p))
j(j−1)
c∗(V ) =
∑
A∈M(V )
Ip(A)
with Ip(A) =
2(j−A(p))
j(j−1)
c∗(V ) and F (V ) =M(V ).
H ∗ satisfies proportionality : Let V be a (j,2) game, A ∈ M(V ), p and q two players
such that p,q < Aj . We have :
Ip(A)
j−A(p) =
2(j−A(p))
j(j−1)
c∗(V )
1
j−A(p) =
2(j−A(p))
j(j−1).c∗(V )
1
j−A(p) =
2
j(j−1).c∗(V ) and
Iq(A)
j−A(q) =
2(j−A(q))
j(j−1)
c∗(V )
1
j−A(q) =
2(j−A(q))
j(j−1).c∗(V )
1
j−A(q) =
2
j(j−1).c∗(V ) , which implies that
Ip(A)
j−A(p) =
Iq(A)
j−A(q) .
Uniqueness
Conversely, let φ be an index which satisfies efficiency, null player, minimal ad-
ditivity, proportionality and merger∗. Let V be a (j,2) game and p ∈ N. As pre-
viously, we proceed by induction on the number of minimal winning j-partitions
of V . Firstly, we prove that φp(V ) = H ∗p(V ) when M(V ) = {A = (A1,A2, ...,Aj)} that
is, |M(V )| = 1. Since |M(V )| = 1, then by minimal additivity φp(V ) = Ip(A). From
proportionnality we have
Ip(A)
j−A(p) =
Iq(A)
j−A(q) for all p,q < Aj , which implies that for all
q < Aj , Iq(A) = j−A(q)j−A(p) .Ip(A). From efficiency, it follows that
∑
q∈N
Iq(A) = 1. Moreover∑
q∈N
Iq(A) = ∑
q∈Aj
Iq(A) + ∑
q<Aj
Iq(A) = ∑
q<Aj
Iq(A) because from the Null player axiom,
Iq(A) = φq(V ) = 0 for all q ∈ Aj . But, for all q < Aj , ∑
q<Aj
Iq(A) = ∑
q<Aj
j−A(q)
j−A(p)Ip(A) =
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Ip(A)
j−A(p)
∑
q<Aj
(j −A(q)); thus, Ip(A) = j−A(p)∑
q<Aj
(j−A(q)) = φp(V ).
On the other hand, H ∗p(V ) =
c∗p(V )
c∗(V ) =
2(j−A(p))
j(j−1)∑
q∈N
2(j−A(q))
j(j−1)
= 2(j−A(p))j(j−1)
j(j−1)
2
∑
q∈N
(j−A(q)) =
j−A(p)∑
q∈N
(j−A(q)) =
j−A(p)∑
q<Aj
(j−A(q)) = φp(V ). Thus, H
∗
p(V ) = φp(V ).
Let r > 1 and assume that H ∗p(V ) = φp(V ) holds for all game V for which there are
at most r − 1 minimal winning j-partitions. Consider a game V with r minimal
winning j-partitions, say A1, A2, ..., Ar . The games V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1 and Vr are merge-
able, where Vr is the (j,2) game with the single minimal j-partitionAr . Furthermore,
V = [V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1]∨Vr and it follows, from the merger∗ axiom that
φp(V ) =
c∗(V1∨...∨Vr−1)
c∗(V ) φp(V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1) + c
∗(Vr )
c∗(V )φp(Vr)
= c
∗(V1∨...∨Vr−1)
c∗(V ) H
∗
p(V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1) + c
∗(Vr )
c∗(V )H
∗
p(Vr)
(thanks to the induction hypothesis)
= H ∗p([V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1]∨Vr) (because H ∗ satisfies the merger∗ axiom)
= H ∗p(V ) (because of the mergeability of V1 ∨ ...∨Vr−1 and Vr)
In conclusion, for all game V on N , all player p ∈N , φp(V ) =H ∗p(V ).
Extension
There are several ways in which the public good indices could be explored in fur-
ther research. First of all, we can study the extension of public good indices to
other games with multiple alternatives of support. Secondly, following the works of
Tchantcho et al. [2008], we can also qualitatively compare the a priori influence of
voters with the three public good indices. Another interesting direction is the ex-
tension of public good indices to (j,2) games which take into account the different a
priori relationships between players in the spirit of Alonso-Meijide et al. [2010] and
Courtin et al. [2017].
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